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JUSTICE BREYER AND PATENT ELIGIBILITY
DAVID O. TAYLOR
Justice Breyer had a significant impact on patent law during his tenure on the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, in my view, that impact was significantly negative for
the doctrine of patent eligibility. Indeed, Justice Breyer authored arguably one of the
worst Supreme Court decisions in the field of patent law in recent memory: Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.1
I. BACKGROUND
Before discussing Mayo, some background might help set the stage. Justice
Breyer joined the Supreme Court on August 3, 1994.2 Prior to that, he served as an
appellate judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.3 He joined that court
late in 1980.4 Notably, however, President Reagan and Congress signed the Federal
Courts Improvement Act on April 2, 1982.5 Thereafter, on October 1, 1982, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit gained exclusive jurisdiction over almost all
appeals in patent infringement and validity cases.6 So, while then-Judge Breyer served
on an intermediate appellate federal court for about fourteen years, it was only from
late 1980 to October 1, 1982—around two years—that that court held jurisdiction over
appeals in patent infringement and validity cases. Notably, during those almost two
years then-Judge Breyer never wrote a single opinion in a patent infringement or
validity case. 7 Nor did he sit on a panel that released any opinion in any patent
infringement or validity case.8 During his time on the First Circuit, he did author
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1 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
2 Current Members, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
6 Id.
7 A search of Westlaw reveals no such cases.
8 Again, a search of Westlaw reveals no such cases. One opinion joined by then-Judge Breyer
vacated and remanded a decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to strike a reissue
application on the basis of fraud on the Patent Office. See generally Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond,
653 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1981).
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opinions in antitrust cases that mentioned patents9 and also in a licensing case that
involved patents. 10 But, effectively, he joined the Supreme Court without any
experience analyzing issues in patent infringement and validity cases.
He did join the Court with some experience in intellectual property more
broadly. For example, when he was on the Harvard Law School faculty he wrote an
article entitled “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs.”11 As explained in a brief summary attached to
the beginning of his article, “[o]n the basis of existing evidence he is unable to conclude
that copyright should be abolished, but he argues that its extension is unnecessary and
would be harmful.” 12 This was not a ringing endorsement of Congress’s decision to
create intellectual property rights.
He also served two years in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice, where his views of patent law may have developed.13 Indeed, Justice Breyer
would repeatedly refer to patents as “monopolies” in his opinions,14 despite the fact
that patents rarely grant their owners actual economic monopolies.15 In this respect
he seems to have adopted an attitude resembling that of a prior Supreme Court Justice,

9 See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988); Clamp-All Corp.
v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988); Kartell v. Blue Sheild of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d
922 (1st Cir. 1984); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
10 Maruho Co. v. Miles, Inc., 13 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1993).
11 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
12 Id.
13 Current Members, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
14 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 279 (2016) (indicating that “inter partes review
helps protect the public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within
their legitimate scope’”) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam. Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 851–52 (2014) (“A
patentee ‘should not be . . . allowed to exact royalties for the use of an idea . . . that is beyond the scope
of the patent monopoly granted.’”) (quoting Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 349–50 (1971)); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 148 (2013) (“[T]his Court
has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the
patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (“And monopolization of those
tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to
promote it.”).
15 See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption,
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1368 (2011) (noting
that “patents are rarely true monopolies; usually alternative ways exist to achieve a result similar to
the one for which the patented invention is utilized.”).
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Justice Douglas, whose patent decisions also referred to patents as monopolies. 16
Unfortunately, Justice Douglas’s opinions have also gained significant attention for
their poor quality, and Justice Douglas’s noted antipathy toward patents may have
similarly stemmed from a misguided understanding of economics and concern with
antitrust laws.17
Regardless, whatever the cause or excuse, Justice Breyer authored one of the
most infamous Supreme Court decisions in the field of patent law: Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.18 Before I discuss that particular case in
detail, however, there are two cases that form the backdrop to Justice Breyer’s
understanding and analysis of patent law demonstrated in his Mayo opinion. In
particular, these cases show Justice Breyer developing, if not gaining support, for his
view of the doctrine of patent eligibility.
II. LABORATORY CORP. V. METABOLITE LABORATORIES, INC.
The first is Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc (“LabCorp”).19 In
this case, the Supreme Court originally granted a writ of certiorari to the Federal
Circuit, only to later dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 20 Justice Breyer
dissented from the decision to dismiss the writ.21 As explained in his dissenting opinion,
the Court granted the writ “to determine whether the patent claim [at issue in the case]
is invalid on the ground that it improperly seeks to claim a monopoly over a basic
scientific relationship.” 22 Based on this question, it is clear the Court anticipated
analyzing patent law’s eligibility requirement. It is also clear that Justice Breyer held
the view that the patent in question, which, he explained, “claims a process for helping
to diagnose deficiencies of two vitamins, folate and cobalamin,” was invalid. 23 In
particular, he explained, the patented “process consists of using any test (whether
patented or unpatented) to measure the level in a body fluid of an amino acid called

16 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972) (“The chemical process or the physical acts which
transform the raw material are, however, sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within
rather definite bounds”); Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 92 (1941)
(referring to “a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave
of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a
heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of
the art.”) (quoting Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883)).
17 Cf. C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
895, 998–99 (2008) (noting that Justice Douglas was “the leading antitrust hawk in our history,” yet
held an “intrinsic inconsistency of his antitrust philosophy”; highlighting the “poor quality of his
opinions in his later years on the Court,” where “[o]ften his fact analysis was superficial and
incomplete”; and concluding that “perhaps the most telling observation of Justice Douglas’ antitrust
legacy is that . . . the first antitrust opinion of the longest sitting Supreme Court justice in our history
(and the Justice who authored more antitrust opinions than anyone on the high Court) . . . is the only
lasting antitrust precedent flowing from Douglas’ pen”).
18 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
19 Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
20 Id. at 125.
21 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22 Id.
23 Id.
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homocysteine and then noticing whether its level is elevated above the norm,” which
indicates “a vitamin deficiency is likely.”24
He explained that “those who engage in medical research, who practice
medicine, and who as patients depend upon proper health care might well benefit from
this Court’s authoritative answer” to the question of whether this claim is invalid as
claiming subject matter ineligible for patenting. 25 The problem, and no doubt the
reason the Court dismissed the writ, was that the Federal Circuit never ruled on the
eligibility of the claim.26 That, however, made no difference to Justice Breyer: “The
question presented is not unusually difficult. We have the authority to decide it. We
said that we would do so. The parties and amici have fully briefed the question. And
those who engage in medical research, who practice medicine, and who as patients
depend upon proper health care might well benefit from this Court’s authoritative
answer.”27
He then explained in detail why, in his view, the claim is invalid. He focused
on the law of eligibility, listing the three historical, common-law exclusions of “laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” before enlisting the Constitution for
support, arguing that “sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent
and copyright protection.”28 Without acknowledging the governing statutory provision
on point (later in the opinion he would call the fact that the Federal Circuit had not
referred to the governing statutory language, 35 U.S.C. § 101, a “technical procedural
reason” for not analyzing eligibility), he argued that “patents do not only encourage
research by providing monetary incentives for invention” but also
“[s]ometimes . . . discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information,
for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by
leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending
patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using
the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.” 29 In other words, in Justice
Breyer’s mind it was a matter of constitutional imperative that the Supreme Court
weigh the benefits and costs of particular patent doctrines to ensure that the benefits
of the patent system exceed its cost. This is a particularly momentous role for the
Supreme Court, especially when its Justices have no relevant qualification or even
experience, let alone empirical data, to serve as a guide in this analysis.
After reciting the facts of the case, as I mentioned, he admitted that “[t]here is
a technical procedural reason for not” answering the question presented, “namely, that
LabCorp did not refer in the lower courts to § 101 of the Patent Act, which sets forth
subject matter that is patentable, and within the bounds of which the ‘law of nature’
principle most comfortably fits.” 30 He also conceded that “[t]here is also a practical
reason for not doing so, namely, that we might benefit from the views of the Federal

Id.
Id. at 126.
26 See generally Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc. v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
27 Lab’y Corp., 548 U.S. at 126 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 126–27 (emphasis in original).
29 Id. at 127.
30 Id. at 132.
24
25
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Circuit, which did not directly consider the question.” 31 Those barriers to review,
however, he thought were overridden by countervailing considerations. He ultimately
wanted to answer the question presented to, in his view, further “the public interest—
including that of clarifying the law in this area sooner rather than later” and, notably,
without hearing the views of the Federal Circuit, despite the fact that “further
consideration by the Federal Circuit might help [the Court] reach a better decision.”32
Even if it amounted to a short circuit to the procedure, Justice Breyer indicated that,
in his view, “the extra time, cost, and uncertainty that further proceedings would
engender are not worth the potential benefit.”33 In short, the court with the relevant
experience considering the policies underlying patent law (the Federal Circuit) need
not help the Supreme Court in answering the momentous question he embraced.
On the merits, Justice Breyer provided one more concession. He conceded that
“the category of nonpatentable phenomena of nature, like the categories of mental
processes and abstract intellectual concepts, is not easy to define.” 34 But, he argued,
“this case is not at the boundary.”35 As a result, he proceeded to address the merits of
the question presented in the case.
The relevant claim, he concluded, “is invalid no matter how narrowly one
reasonably interprets” the natural phenomena doctrine.36 “There can be little doubt
that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency,” he added, “is a
natural phenomenon.”37
The most significant problem with the reasoning Justice Breyer used to reach
his conclusion—an error that would only appear clearly later when he finally found
the opportunity in Mayo to author a majority opinion addressing patent eligibility
law—only made a faint appearance in this case. He (seemingly, here; more clearly later)
rejected the longstanding, traditional approach to patent eligibility that long provided
the dividing line between ineligible natural phenomena and eligible applications of
natural phenomena. 38 He highlighted how the respondents argued “that the
correlation is nonetheless patentable because claim 13 packages it in the form of a
‘process’ for detecting vitamin deficiency, with discrete testing and correlating steps.” 39
After recognizing how the Supreme Court’s recent cases supported this distinction, e.g.,
Diehr (“an application of a law of nature . . . to a known . . . process may well be
deserving of patent protection”), he nevertheless seemed to reject it.40
He did, at first, indicate he would consider whether the claim in question
described an application of the law of nature or natural phenomena.41 He concluded,
on point, that the claims “embody only the correlation between homocysteine and
vitamin deficiency that the researchers uncovered.” 42 There was, however, an
Id.
Id. at 133–34.
33 Id. at 133.
34 Id. at 134 (internal quotations omitted).
35 Id. at 135.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 136.
40 Id. at 135.
41 Id. at 126.
42 Id. at 128.
31
32
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argument that the claims did not only embody this correlation. The claims required
drawing blood and testing for the presence of the relevant biomarker. 43 Under the
traditional analysis of patent eligibility, any practical application of the natural
phenomenon would make the claim eligible for patenting.44 And, here, there at least
was a basis to argue that the practical application of the law of nature or natural
phenomenon was use of these steps to diagnose disease. Under this analysis, however,
the Court would need to decide whether a diagnosis qualifies as a practical application.
Justice Breyer, however, did not answer that question. Thus, the irony is that,
despite his inflated view of the role of the Supreme Court and dismissal of
Congressional statutory language, his discounting of the importance of Federal Circuit
insights, and his decision to plow ahead despite difficulty defining the relevant legal
principles, the traditional approach to patent eligibility may have justified finding the
particular claim in this case invalid. 45 The claim may not have involved any
application of the relevant law of nature or natural phenomenon.
In Justice Breyer’s view, however, it did not matter whether diagnosis
qualified as an application of the newly-discovered natural phenomenon.46 In short,
according to Justice Breyer, to the extent a medical diagnostic used an old method to
detect a biomarker, that medical diagnostic should not be patentable. 47 It did not
matter that no one in history had ever identified the correlation between the biomarker
and the presence of disease and, moreover, no one had ever used that knowledge to
diagnose disease. And this approach—Justice Breyer’s approach to patent eligibility—
history would later prove, completely undermined the idea of patenting medical
diagnostics.
Notably, Justice Breyer gained the support of only two of his colleagues,
Justices Stevens and Souter.48
III. BILSKI V. KAPPOS
The second case that forms the backdrop to the Mayo opinion is the Supreme
Court’s consideration of Bilski v. Kappos.49 In Bilski, the Court granted certiorari to
consider whether, in Justice Breyer’s words, “a general method of engaging in business
transactions” is a “patentable process within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.” 50
Notably, Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens’s opinion that would have held that
“business methods” are not eligible for patenting. 51 The Court’s majority opinion,
43

2004).

See Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc. v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir.

44 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. R EV. 565, 565 (2016) (“[F]or over
one hundred years, American authority consistently maintained that practical application
distinguished unpatentable discovery from patentable invention.”).
45 See e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981) (stating that “an application of a law
of nature . . . to a known . . . process may well be deserving of patent protection”) (emphasis in
original).
46 Lab’y Corp., 548 U.S. at 135–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)
50 Id. at 657 (Breyer, J., concurring).
51 Id. “Business methods,” at least in the context of this case, include computerized methods of
conducting business transactions. Id. at 599–605.
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written by Justice Kennedy, did not go so far, although it rejected the particular claim
at issue in the case as ineligible for patenting because it was an unpatentable abstract
idea (not because it described a “business method”).52
One thing that is particularly notable about Justice Stevens’s concurring
opinion, which Justice Breyer joined, is that it misunderstands the legislative history
behind the Patent Act of 1952. 53 That legislative history states that “[a] person may
have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the
sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless
the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.”54 This language refers to the fact that § 101
does not express all the conditions of patentability. Other sections of the patent statute
also define the conditions of patentability, including, for example, novelty and nonobviousness, conditions the patent statute recites in §§ 102 and 103. 55 But Justice
Stevens misunderstood that language to mean that, even if someone invented
“anything under the sun,” § 101 itself may still define why that invention is not
patentable. 56 Justice Breyer would later rely on similarly misguided reasoning to
distort the purpose of § 101 of the patent statute and, indeed, to confuse § 101 with the
other conditions of patentability created by Congress and put into other statutory
sections.
Justice Breyer also wrote separately in Bilski to make several points, many
reflected in LabCorp., that he would later work into his opinion for the court in Mayo.
First, he argued that the text of § 101, while broad, “is not without limit.”57 He then,
after quoting an opinion describing patents as an “embarrassment” and as a
“limited . . . monopoly,” repeated his concern for the court-created, non-statutory
exceptions to patent eligibility (phenomena of nature, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts) and the need for the Court to interpret the Patent Act to
“determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.”58 Second,
while purporting to support the usefulness of the so-called machine-or-transformation
test for patent eligibility, saying it has “repeatedly helped the Court to determine what
is a patentable process,” he rejected it as the “sole test” for determining patent
eligibility.59 Third, he cited to his LabCorp dissent as support for rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s test for determining eligibility.60 Notably, however, he did not articulate the
eligibility test he would later express in Mayo.61
In short, in Bilski, Justice Breyer, while not identifying any test for
determining eligibility, demonstrated, again, solicitude for arguments constraining
patent eligibility, for considering patents to be embarrassing monopolies, and for

Id. at 612.
See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54 See Id. at 642 (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952) and H.R. Rep. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
55 35 U.S.C §§ 102, 103, 112 (2022).
56 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 642 (Stevens, J. concurring) (construing “not necessarily patentable
under section 101 unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled” from the legislative history to mean
“not necessarily patentable under section 101”) (emphasis added).
57 Id. at 658 (Breyer, J., concurring).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 659.
60 Id.
61 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
52
53
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making the Supreme Court (and not Congress or the Federal Circuit) the arbiter of
patent eligible subject matter. Justice Breyer’s opinion indicated support for Justice
Stevens’s primary dissent, which gained the support of four Justices. 62 But Justice
Breyer’s opinion, at least the relevant part for our purposes, was joined only by Justice
Scalia.63 Justice Breyer had not yet, apparently, persuaded the Court to join in his
views. He would, though, in Mayo.
IV. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES V. PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES, INC.
As I have been noting, LabCorp and Bilski proved to be prelude to Mayo. In
this later case, Justice Breyer finally gained the opportunity to author a majority
opinion reflecting own views about the dangers of expansive patent eligibility. Indeed,
his opinion in this case was joined by all of the other Justices; it was a unanimous
opinion.64
Justice Breyer’s analysis of the law of eligibility in Mayo starts innocuously
enough. He explains that an application of a law of nature may be eligible, and that a
claim must do more than simply state the law of nature and add the words “apply it.” 65
The opinion, however, goes downhill from there. Instead of explaining why the patent
claim at issue—a process of determining the effectiveness of an administered drug—
did not actually describe how to apply the law of nature (the law of nature was the
correlation of a biomarker and effectiveness of a drug), Justice Breyer created a new
test for eligibility that has no legitimate basis in the history of the Supreme Court’s
analysis of patent eligibility, let alone in the patent statute or even in good policy.66
The test Justice Breyer created in this case is the requirement that a claim
describe “significantly more”—whatever that means—than a law of nature, a
requirement the opinion describes as the search for an “inventive concept.” 67
Remarkably, this test directly contradicted over 100 years of Supreme Court case law,
because what Justice Breyer sought to find—even when an inventor made a discovery
of a previously-unknown law of nature and applied that discovery to some useful end—
was something “significantly more” than a useful application of a law of nature.68 But
the historical standard was the idea that whoever discovers a natural phenomenon or
law of nature may obtain a patent if that person discloses how to use that natural
phenomenon or law of nature to achieve some real benefit. 69 Instead of allowing the
patent system to reward that inventor, Justice Breyer layered on top of the traditional
requirement the idea that “something more” is required. 70 What exactly that
something more is, he did not explain. He only condemned a discovery when it was
combined with any “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658–60 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 657.
64 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
65 Id. at 72.
66 Id. at 72–73.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“It is now commonplace that an application of
a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection.”) (emphasis in original).
70 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73.
62
63
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in by researchers in the field”—but it was exactly that conventional activity that, for
over a century, had been enough to earn a patent. 71 Indeed, Peter Menell and Jeff
Lefstin in subsequent cases at the Supreme Court have repeatedly explained how
Justice Breyer’s misunderstood the foundational, 19th Century English and American
precedent on point.72 While true, the opinion also contradicts more recent precedent.
For example, in Diamond v. Diehr,73 decided by the Court in 1981, the Court explained
that “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is
of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the
§ 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”74 In other words, for eligibility
purposes, it does not matter whether the method applying the newly-discovered law of
nature is conventional or includes something that is new. 75 It is enough that the
discovery is applied to achieve some benefit.76
Beyond the creation of a test without precedential support, in Mayo Justice
Breyer rejected the notion (notably supported by the government in its amicus brief)77
that the statutory patentability requirements outside of § 101 provide the necessary
screening of claims. 78 These patentability requirements include the novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, written description, and definiteness requirements found in
§§ 102, 103, and 112. 79 Despite the clear legislative history supporting this exact
proposition, Justice Breyer rejected it out of hand in the same way Justice Stevens
misunderstood it in Bilski, as discussed above.80
The test Justice Breyer created in Mayo also has had pernicious effects. No
medical diagnostic claim has survived a patent eligibility challenge at the Federal
Circuit since Mayo. Just imagine how diagnostic inventions may have helped fight the
COVID pandemic, when we repeatedly heard cries for increased and improved
diagnoses of infection. One particularly disheartening example of the way Justice
Breyer’s test ultimately causes incorrect results and eliminates the incentive for
developing advances in medical diagnostics is Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,

Id. at 73.
Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition
for A Writ of Certiorari, Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, No. 20-891 (S. Ct. Mar. 1,
2021); Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition
for A Writ of Certiorari, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 15-1182 (S. Ct. Apr. 20, 2016).
73 Diehr, 450 U.S. 175.
74 Id. at 188–89.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Mayo, 566 U.S. 66
(2007) (No. 10-1150) 2011 WL 4040414 at *8, 32 (“Properly conceived, however, petitioners’ objections
arise not under Section 101, but under the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of 35 U.S.C. 102
and 103 . . . The only role of Section 101 . . . is to identify the types of subject matter that may be
eligible for patent protection if “the conditions and requirements” of Title 35 are satisfied.”).
78 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89 (“[I]n [the United States’] view, other statutory provisions—those that
insist that a claimed process be novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102, that it not be obvious in light of prior art, § 103,
and that it be ‘full[y], clear[ly], concise[ly], and exact[ly]’ described, § 112—can perform this screening
function . . . This approach, however, would make the “law of nature” exception to § 101 patentability
a dead letter.”).
79 Id.
80 See id.; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 642 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); S. Rep. No. 1979,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952) and H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).
71
72

[21:71:2022]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

80

Inc.81 In this case, the Mayo test was used to invalidate patent claims on an invention
that allowed for the diagnosis of genetic abnormalities in unborn babies. 82 The
inventors made an award winning advance that significantly reduced the risk of
miscarriages; they discovered that certain fetal DNA could be detected in a mother’s
bloodstream, and they combined this discovery with conventional techniques to detect
this fetal DNA.83 Instead of taking tissue samples from the fetus or placenta, they
determined that only a simple blood test would be necessary.84 One Federal Circuit
judge lamented that the Supreme Court’s historic standard for patent eligibility would
have resulted in the inventors securing a valid patent, because their invention
“effectuated a practical result and benefit not previously attained.” 85 He saw “no
reason, in policy or statute, why this breakthrough invention should be deemed patent
ineligible,” but was required to find it ineligible under the Mayo test.86
The test unfortunately has also migrated, ultimately infecting all of patent
eligibility law. While Justice Breyer’s opinion in Mayo focused on medical technologies,
later the Supreme Court would adopt his test in Alice v. CLS Bank and apply it in the
context of computer technology. 87 The non-statutory prohibition on claiming an
“abstract idea” now depends on whether the claim includes “something more,” and in
particular an “inventive concept.” But we still do not have any indication of what an
“inventive concept” is (rather than what it is not), and this test still contradicts the
historical eligibility standard.88 Moreover, most recently, Justice Breyer’s test has even
been used to invalidate claims to mechanical technologies. In American Axle &
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims
to liner for an automobile driveshaft, where the liner is designed to reduce vibrations.89
According to the Federal Circuit and in light of Mayo, it did not matter that the claims
described a liner that was new and non-obvious.90 The claims, said the court, merely
applied Hook’s law in a conventional way.91 A petition in that case, notably, is pending
at the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has asked for the views of the Solicitor
General.92 Regardless of how that cases ultimately is resolved, it is quite startling that
Justice Breyer’s test has resulted in a court finding that a mechanical invention is not
the type of invention even eligible to be considered for patenting.
Finally, and perhaps most disheartening, in my own research I have shown
that investors have reduced investments in the development of medical technologies
as a result of Justice Breyer’s Mayo decision.93 As I explain there, “the major takeaway
is clear: the Supreme Court’s ‘drastic and far-reaching experiment’ in patent eligibility
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id.
83 Id. at 1373–74.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., concurring).
86 Id.
87 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014)
88 Id. at 217, 221–22.
89 Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
90 Id. at 1291–92
91 Id.
92 Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 141 S. Ct. 2594 (2021) (inviting the Solicitor
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States).
93 See generally David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 2019
(2020).
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standards”—an experiment that began in earnest with Justice Breyer’s Mayo opinion–
“has likely resulted in lost investment in the life sciences that has delayed or altogether
prevented the development of medicines and medical procedures.”94
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer leaves the Supreme Court having left a significant mark on
patent eligibility law. In Mayo, he eliminated the ability to obtain patents on many
useful applications of new (and even breakthrough) discoveries. Unfortunately, as I
have discussed, the test he created to do so both contradicts the historical approach to
patent eligibility (something he appears not to have even recognized) and has had
pernicious impact on the patent system and investment in development of technology,
including, and in particular, medical technologies. While of course I wish him well in
retirement, I hope the full Court, including his successor, will give the patent eligibility
doctrine a fresh look when it reviews the government’s upcoming amicus brief in
American Axle. Without Justice Breyer on the bench, I have more hope the Court might
reconsider the “inventive concept” requirement he created in Mayo.

94

Id. at 2094.

